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Dina Gusejnova 
 
Changes of status  states of political uncertainty: towards a 
social theory of derecognition 
 
This article examines existing versions of recognition theory, which is typically 
concerned with the enfranchisement of previously subaltern groups. Looking at 
several empirical case studies of social practices from twentieth-century history, it 
draws attention to the importance of status loss and the depreciation of value in 
periods of political rupture, particularly after the First World War. To conceptualise 
such examples, we need an expansion in the existing vocabulary of recognition 
theory. The article proposes ways to develop a theory of derecognition which might 
be used to guide empirical research on informal practices of political change.  
 
 
Theories of recognition have been widely used to analyse processes of political 
legitimation. Recognition is seen as a practice RI DFNQRZOHGJLQJ D ɈSDUWQHU LQ
LQWHUVXEMHFWLYH LQWHUDFWLRQɉ, as a result of which each subject or group is not only 
formally enfranchised but also achieves equal status in informal interaction (Honneth 
1994). Practices of recognition enable societies to transcend forms of subjectivity 
JURXQGHGRQD ɈIDOVH GLVWRUWHG DQG UHGXFHGPRGHRI EHLQJɉ DQG FRQWULEXWH Wo 
social equality by incorporating subaltern groups (Taylor 1982, 25). Due to its 
emphasis on diachronic aspects of social practice and non-institutional types of 
agency, recognition theory is particularly suited to interdisciplinary empirical 
research involving historical studies of reforms, revolutions, and other forms of 
political rupture. In this article, I am interested in looking more closely at the 
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conceptual vocabulary of recognition theory in this context. My hope is to expand 
this vocabulary in order to account for aspects of political change which have not 
been fully captured by existing approaches. By states of uncertainty I mean, broadly, 
a situation typically encompassing the lifetime of one generation, in which the status 
of governments, individuals or groups, and even of things and artefacts, is called 
into question. In these contexts, the value of statuses and artefacts remains uncertain 
over protracted periods of time. But in large sections of this article, I am going to be 
exploring more specific examples of uncertainty in the aftermath of the First World 
War and the Russian and German revolutions.  
Like some other theoretical models which help explain changing forms of 
legitimation, such as social contract theory, recognition theory undermines 
primordialist or organicist conceptions of justice and power. In particular, 
recognition theorists aspire to provide an account of positive change which includes 
formerly inferior groups in the social process. However, due to this perspective, 
which naturally foregrounds the enfranchisement of subalterns, recognition theorists 
often disregard the fact that such forms of progressive transformation are often 
accompanied by ɈQHJDWLYHɉprocesses, including, notably, the political delegitmation 
of social groups and governments. It is these types of process that I am concerned 
with here. I suggest that they could be usefully captured through the concept of 
Ɉderecognitionɉ, which might form a theoretical complement to existing approaches 
in recognition theory.  
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The notion of derecognition [DEURJDWLR$EHUNHQQXQJG«FRQQDLVVDQFH] has 
not made a visible foray into social theory, even though, as I will discuss, the term 
itself has been used in a range of fields for a long time. Historians and other 
disciplines studying empirical cases of political rupture would benefit from using the 
concept more systematically. Conversely, some recent historical research into social 
practices in times of reform and revolution could also help refine the theoretical 
conceptualisation of recognition.  
At times of rapid political change, which could be viewed on a wide spectrum 
from reform to revolution (see the discussion by Skocpol 1979/2015 or Dunn 1989), 
it is often the case that previously inferior, misrecognised groups gain acceptance. 
However, such moments of enfranchisement are also frequently accompanied by 
informal as well as legal action through which old privileges or statuses are publicly 
disavowed. In what follows, I shall provide a range of empirical and theoretical 
perspectives on practices of social transformation, including the abrogation of 
privileges, denaturalization, and discrediting previously respected individuals or 
groups Ʌ which, I suggest, can be described summatively with the term 
ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ While most cases stem from the history of central and eastern 
Europe in the early to mid-twentieth century, the notion of derecognition as such is 
equally pertinent to similar examples from other geographical regions and periods. 
Before any empirical case studies can be discussed, however, I will first outline how 
UHFRJQLWLRQWKHRU\KDVGHYHORSHGDQGZKHUHWKHFRQFHSWRIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉPLJKW
fit to develop it further. 
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I 
The scope of recognition theory 
 
Advocates of recognition approaches have highlighted their capacity to account for 
social conflict, which utilitarian or rational models of political change, such as social 
contract theory, tend to discount (most recently, this view of recognition theory has 
been advanced in Miller 2016; but see also the classic formulation in Honneth 1994). 
Whereas social contract theorists might examine a supposedly transformative 
contractual situation or a constitutive moment in which a government or entity is 
being empowered to represent a larger population, recognition theorists envisage 
status change as a set of repeatable informal processes. In this sense, theories of 
recognition are related both to socia contract theory and to constructivist theories 
of status and identity more broadly (see e.g. Rawls 1971 for a classic modern 
restatement of social contract theory; see also Searle 1990; Fraser 1989; Butler 1990; 
Appiah and Gutman 1996; Anderson 1983). Despite this emphasis on practice, 
recognition theorists have also been criticised for their limited account of cultural 
practices and group identities. For instance, some recognition theorists questioned 
WKHIRFXVRQLQWHUVXEMHFWLYHUHFRJQLWLRQLQ+RQQHWKɉVPRGHORIWKHWKHRU\DQGFDOOHG
for a need to recognise the multiplicity of cultures within polities (Taylor and Gutman 
1994). Others insisted that any norm concerning intersubjective recognition ought 
to guarantee the preservation of some valued personal or group characteristics 
(Kalyvas 1999, 103; Zurn 2012, and see Honneth 2016 for a response). While such 
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critiques are valid, their implications will not be covered in what follows, since my 
concern is with the more basic tenets of recognition theory that these criticisms do 
not touch upon, i.e. the focus on informal and repeated practice as opposed to 
single contractual events, imagined or real. 
The history of recognition theory itself is illuminating for understanding how 
informal social interaction is conceptualised in this framework. Most twentieth-
century theories of recognition are indebted to G.W.F. Hegel, particularly, the section 
RI+HJHOɉVPhilosophy of Spirit, RIWHQWUDQVODWHGDVɈ/RUGVKLSDQG%RQGDJHɉRUPRUH
DFFXUDWHO\ DV Ɉ/RUGVKLS DQG6HUYLWXGHɉ +HJHO  IRU WKH UHFHSWLRQ VHH Shklar 
1991; Fraser 1999; Taylor 1994; Honneth 1994, Onuf 2013). The section is now one of 
the most frequently cited fragments of his work outside the discipline of Philosophy 
(Beiser 2011). +HJHOɉVWKLQNLQJDERXWVRFLDOFKDQJHexposed the connection between 
forms of consciousness and progress in the real world by proposing a 
counterintuitive, yet compelling perspective on the capacity of human emancipation 
under conditions of social inequality. In this parable involving an imaginary lord and 
a bondsman, Hegel argued that in this unequal relationship, it is the bondsman and 
not the lord who has a more direct path to emancipation through self-
consciousness. In legal terms, he is an inferior subject, but given his real experience 
of the world in this situation, which has to do with his use of labour and his material 
impact on the things that he is labouring upon, Hegel argues, the bondsman has 
the ability to access a fuller understanding of himself and others. By contrast, the 
ORUGɉV relationship to things in this world remains mediated through dependence on 
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the bondsman, despite the fact that the bondsmain is subordinate to him in terms 
of his social status.  
In discussing the relationship of people to each other and to things in the 
framework of his philosophy of history, Hegel transferred the discussion of 
intersubjective recognition from the legal and theological spheres to political 
philosophy and metaphysics. Recognition, in the widest sense, can apply as much to 
intersubjective situations, as it can to people and their own selves. Subsequently, this 
imaginary case has been developed more fully to show that the social practice of 
recognition in this intersubjective sense can be seen as a key instrument of human 
self-emancipation.  
Before accounting for the nature of this reception, it is worth emphasising 
that +HJHO KLPVHOI XVHG WKH ZRUG ɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉ Anerkennung) itself only rarely. 
1RQHWKHOHVV HYHQ LI ZH FDQQRW FRXQW ɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉ DPRQJ +HJHOɉV personal 
keywords, it was certainly available to him as a concept, since it was a known juridical 
term ,XVHFRQFHSWKHUH LQ.RVHOOHFNɉVVHQVH&I.RVHOOHFN European 
jurists and theologians before and after Hegel had XVHGWKHFRQFHSWRIɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉ
in the context of studies of Roman law, in the practice of civil law, in comparative 
anthropology, and, in theological literature, in relation to the psychological process 
RIDFNQRZOHGJLQJRQHɉVVLQV%¦KU/HRQKDUG)O¸UFNHMoreover, the 
first generations of his readers were more interested in +HJHOɉV concept of 
consciousness than recognition. Notably, for Marx, +HJHOɉVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIlabour 
as a source of self-consciousness was threatened under conditions of modern 
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industrial production, while the idea of the state, which for Hegel was the highest 
realisation of consciousness, turned out to be RQH RI WKH VRXUFHV RI KXPDQLW\ɉV
alienation from itself (Marx 1846/1932, Breckman 1999, 73 and passim). The theme 
of consciousness as a prerequisite of revolutions ZKLFK +HJHOɉV WKHRU\ KDG
foregrounded, remained central for twentieth-FHQWXU\0DU[LVWV OLNH*HRUJ/XN£FV
$FFRUGLQJWR/XN£FVvHODERUDWLRQRQ0DU[vVVWDJHVWKHRU\RIKLVWRU\WKHGHJUHHRI
vFRQVFLRXVQHVVvRIKLVWRULFDODFWRUVRIWKHLURZQVLWXDWLRQGLIIHUHGLQGLIIHUHQWDJHV
the capitalist age, for instance, was a more conscious age than the precapitalist one, 
where class consciousness has to be won or extracted. /XN£FV 
Thus recognition only became a key term for understanding +HJHOɉV social 
thought retrospectively. Recognition theory as it is known today eventually 
developed most prominently in an Anglophone context in the decades following the 
Second World War, yet prior to this, it had been a prominent feature in the political 
thought of Russian philosophers engaged in rethinking revolutionary periods 
against the dominant narratives of orthodox Marxism between the 1920s and the 
1940s. One of the key twentieth-century sources of thinking about recognition was 
the influential reading advanced by $OH[DQGUH.RMªYH in his interwar and wartime 
OHFWXUHVLQ3DULV.RMªYH)RU.RMªYHWKHFHQWUDOIRUFHRI +HJHOɉVWKHRU\
was the focus on consciousness as an agent of history, and within it, his description 
of the desire to be recognised by others and to develop self-consciousness.RMªYHɉV
LQIOXHQWLDO FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RI ɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉ LQ )UHQFK $PHULFDQ DQG SRVWZDU
German WKRXJKW DOORZHG WR UHGLVFRYHU +HJHOvV FRQFHSW RI FRQVFRXVQHVV
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independently from the idea of a class struggle, presenting it as an intersubjective 
process reflecting the human desire for identity (Taylor 1975; Butler 1987; Honneth 
1994 and 2003; Jagentowicz Mills 1996; Pippin 2011).. The idea of human agency in 
social transformation had changed, as .RMªYHɉV VWXGHQWV SURFHHGHG WR DVFULEH
particular historical significance to the psychological history of revolutions, which 
they conceptualized as the moment when a recent object of misrecognition, or a 
non-recognised group, becomes a new subject capable of recognising others. 
Psychoanalytic schools of thought, such as that of Donald Winnicott and his 
followers (Winnicott 1965), drew on this concept in explaining the process of 
maturation by which a child acquires recognition from the mother. Gender theorists 
GHVFULEH WKH UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH SHUVRQ RI ɈWURXEOHGɉ JHQGHU E\ WKH KHWHURVH[XDO
majority.  
A second important source for twentieth-century ideas of recognition drew 
its inspiration from  +HJHOɉVZRUNRQ$HVWKHWLFVWKRXJKWKHUHFHSWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSW
of recognition in this area has evolved along quite separate lines IURPWKDWRI+HJHOɉV
political thought (Hegel 1823, 1998, 2014). One of the key figures in this context was 
the 5XVVLDQSKLORVRSKHU*XVWDY ÒSHW. Ɉ,QRUGHU IRU VRPHWKLQJ WR EH VRFLDOO\ UHDO
VRFLDOO\ YDOXDEOHɉ ZURWH ÒSHW LQ  ɈWKH UHOHYDQW VRFLHW\ PXVW UHFRJQL]H LW
Recognition (come on, old man: Anerkennung) is a determinative [sic!] category of 
WKH VRFLDOɉ 3ORWQLNRY FLWLQJÒSHW:RUNLQJ LQ UHYROXWLRQDU\
5XVVLDÒpet had been part of a circle of avangarde theorists who wanted to bridge 
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science and art in capturing the relationship of representation to reality in a 
UHYROXWLRQDU\ÒSHW 
IQWKHORQJUXQKRZHYHUÒSHWɉVZRUNZDVIRUJRWWHQLQWKHZLGHULQWHUQDWLonal 
context of social theory. The next significant Ʌ and, for a wide range of reasons, 
much more widely known -- UHFHSWLRQ SHULRG RI +HJHOɉV $HVWKHWLFV LQ WHUPV RI
recognition theory did not start until the work of Arthur Danto, who used it to 
develop a constructivist theory of art (Danto 1998, Danto 2014). However, in the end 
it was .RMªYHvV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ which had the greatest influence on a number of 
subsequent social theorists, including Judith Butler, Charles Taylor and Robert 
Pippin. For them, WKHFRQWLQXHGUHOHYDQFHRI+HJHOɉVFRQFHSWOLHVLQKLVHPSKDVLVRQ
reason being a social process, rather than an ideal (Taylor and Gutman 1982, Butler 
1990, Pippin 2011). What unites these later twentieth-century and early twenty-first 
century readings of Hegel is the observation that the chief role in bringing about 
revolutionary change belongs to the formerly inferior object as a decisive subject of 
historical change. The bourgeois becomes a revolutionary agent, the child becomes 
an adult, etc., and only when the former object of misrecognition has become an 
active subject can revolutionary change occur. At each historical moment when a 
QHZLGHQWLW\LVUHFRJQLVHGɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉis revealed as a driving force of history.  
For the political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, the model for the gradual 
expansion of rights in the modern age is derived from the practice of ennoblement 
(Waldron 2012). The dignity and rights formerly applicable only to nobles were 
gradually extended to other citizens. Granting rights is a linear, expandable process 
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of acknowledging social standing. Judith Shklar has argued similarly that the rights 
that constitute American citizenship ought more properly to be called ɈHPEOHPVɉRU
badges of honour derived from the entitlement to work and to vote (Shklar 2001). 
2Q WKLV UHDGLQJ DOO FLWL]HQV EHFRPH ɈQREOHɉ ZKHQ WKH &LYLO &RGH LV LQWURGXFHG
(leaving slightly unclear the question whether the same occurs through time in 
places where no Civil Code exists) (Whitman 2005).  In this light, the public act of 
recognising always appears as an act of constructing equality, rather than destroying 
privilege or other social statuses. Another example of this is the introduction of the 
Napoleonic Code to states under his control, which extended rights previously 
granted only to privileged estates to all citizens of the state. Citizens were recognised 
as subjects of honour, previously an exclusive privilege of royalty and nobility. In the 
international sphere, the recognition of human rights to all humans independently 
of their former status as mere citizens (Sands 2016), the recognition of governments 
in exile (McGilvray 2010) or fledglinJɈQDWLRQVLQZDLWLQJɉKDVJHQHUDWHGDQRWKHUZDYH
of interest in recognition as a mechanism of social transformation. (Bahcheli, 
Bartmann, and Srebrnik, 2004). The process of gradual inclusion of formerly 
misrcognised subjects into a community of citizens or states can thus also been 
captured by this term, making the concept of revolution and, within it, the struggle 
for state power, almost obsolete. 
In sum, the FRQFHSWRIɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉKDVFRPHWRGHVFULEHVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV of 
enfranchisement as a key aspect of progress. ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W +HJHOɉV ZRUN RQ
recognition in the fields of aesthetic representation and political philosophy has 
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served as a key inspiration, but with few exceptions, these two strands of reception 
were evolving separately (the exceptions include Pippin 2011, Kompridis 2013, 2014). 
6HFRQGO\GHVSLWH+HJHOɉVRZQGLDOHFWLFDOPRGHORIUHFRJQLWLRQWZHQWLHWK-century 
VRFLDOWKHRULVWVKDYHIRFXVHGDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\RQWKHɈLQIHULRUɉVXEMHFWDVWKHUHDO
agent of change. Often related to ideas such                             
as empowerment &DOYªV, the notion of recognition as it has developed since 
Hegel favours the focus on the formerly stigmatised, the recently undignified, the 
perspective of the IRUPHU ɈERQGVPDQɉ RYHU WKH IRUPHr lord. Yet in historical 
experience, a key corrollary of social transformations includes negative processes, 
such as the stigmatization of the former stigmatizers, as an essential element in 
ensuring the equality of subjects thereafter. This is particularly reflected in the sphere 
of representation, including such instances as political cartoons or cultural 
propaganda in revolutionary periods where stigmatization or disavowal of privilege 
often loom larger than the celebration of a newly emancipated subject of history. 
Ɉ1HJDWLYHɉSURFHVVHVIROORZDIRUPRIWKHLURZQZKLFKLVPRUHWKDQMXVWDQɈLQYHUVLRQɉ
of the positive or inclusionary direction. Charting the course of status destruction in 
its social and symbolic manifestations could help in thinking through the structural 
differences which are at the heart of lasting political transformations. 
 
 
 
II 
  12 
The concept of derecognition  
 
To grasp processes which include elements of destruction or negation of status and 
value in times of political rupture, I propose to use the FRQFHSWRIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ. 
The closest use of the concept in this sense comes from Political Theory and the 
theory of IR. Recently, theorists of international law have invoked the idea of a 
ɈGRFWULQHRIGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉDVDVXpposedly new mode of soft power conducive to 
non-violent regime change, suggesting that this would constitute a new paradigm 
for managing such situations (Auron 2013 DV D FULWLFDO FRPSOHPHQW WR ɈSRVLWLYHɉ
recognition theory and IR, e.g. Greenhill 2008). As a practice of foreign relations, the 
term has previously appeared in the discussion of the status of China and Taiwan in 
the 1970s (Unger 1979, Kayes 1980). ,QWKHFDVHRI,QGLDWKHWHUPɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉKDV
been applied to the incomplete loss of power of the Indian princes between the 
1940s and the 1970s, describing the abrogation of privileges in the princely states by 
the government of independent India in the 1970s (Richter 1971). The term was also 
used in the 1970s, when the United States derecognised Taiwan as a legitimate 
government of China (Unger 1979, Kayes 1980). In earlier historical periods, such 
interventions were conceptualised under different terms, such as the struggle 
against tyranny, humanitarian intervention, anarchism, and the fight against 
totalitarianism.  
However, the notion of derecognising governments has also been present in 
the political discourses of the nineteenth and twentieth century. At its most 
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categorical is the non-recognition of all governments by anarchist theorists and 
activists (Cf. Vincent 2011). Perhaps most famous in this regard are the words of the 
Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, according to whom the states of Europe of his 
WLPHɈ>O@LNHZRUQ-out old men, their skin shrivelled and their feet stumbling, gnawed 
aWE\PRUDOVLFNQHVVHVLQFDSDEOHRIHPEDUNLQJRQWKHWLGHRIQHZLGHDVɉZHUHOLYLQJ
ɈRQFUHGLWRQWKHLUSDVWɉDQGE\GRLQJVRPHUHO\KDVWHQHGɈWKHLUHQGVE\VTXDEEOLQJ
OLNH DJHG JRVVLSVɉ .URSRWNLQ   &DWHJRULFDOO\ GHQ\LQJ OHJLWLPDF\ WR
governments in their modern form also obviously remained an important tradition 
for Marx, and later for Lenin. But in the longer history of political theory, too, the 
idea of revoking the legitimacy of governments looked back on an older tradition: 
the discourses on the right of resistance to tyrants and illegitimate governments that 
was associated with Protestant and other dissident movements in early modern 
Europe (Cf. Baumgoldt 2007, 27-51; Schwoerer 1993). 
7RGD\WKHQRWLRQRIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉDVDSUDFWLFHLVPost widely invoked in 
financial theory and accounting (Opperman 2008, Subramani 2009, Law and Owen 
2010), and bargaining (Korczynski and Ritson 2000). However, what I think is needed 
is to make the concept available for the description of a dual perspective on the 
process of status depreciation for individuals, as well as institutions and things. For 
example, it can be used to describe those who revoke RWKHUVɉ rights, such as in cases 
when some groups or political communities cease to consider a government to be 
a legitimate holder of power and speak or act so as to make their views public. It 
can also capture the process and the experience of being derecognised, i.e. the 
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subjective perception RIEHFRPLQJDɈIRUPHUɉSHUVRQ or sharing a lifeworld with one. 
More broadly, a social theory of ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ can be used to emphasise the 
significance of practices of shaming or discrediting former holders of power, or the 
withering away of privilege, which occurs in the shadow of more widely publicised 
acts of recognition, such as proclamations of or demands for rights. Conceptualised 
in this sense, the practice of derecognition nonetheless deserves special attention 
both from theorists and from empirical social scientists.  
It is important to distinguish ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ as used above from seemingly 
similar terms which are widely used by recognition theorists, such as non-
recognition, misrecogniton, or inferiorisation. These are all terms which theorists 
including Axel Honneth and Judith Butler have construed as the logical negative 
FRPSOHPHQWVRIɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉ)RULQVWDQFHRQHFRXOGDUJXHWKDWZRPHQWHQGWREH
not recognised as political subjects in premodern patriarchal societies. But they are 
not derecognised, because in these societies they have never been recognised in 
the first place. Equally, in some societies, an ethnic group could be misrecognised 
as inferior and subject to persecution. Societies that consider themselves modern 
tend to derecognise and thus delegitimate schemas that they consider traditional.  
In terms of social ontology, derecognition could be described as the 
performance of acts (economic, legal, and intellectual) by which existing statuses (de 
facto as well as de jure) are conferred to new groups. The need for such a 
mechanism is most evident in civil and international criminal law, when a state 
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deprives groups of rights that it had formerly granted them, or when a community 
of states no longer acknowledges another state as legitimate.  
Among the earliest instances I could find of using the concept of 
ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉWRGHVFULEHthe relationship between civil society and governments 
was an article by the Russian legal theorist and social activist Benjamin Mandel (1863-
1931). Mandel lived in exile in Finland and later in Berlin after the revolution of 1917. 
Writing in a German journal specialising in comparative law, he spoke of the 
derecognition of the Soviet government by former subjects of the Russian empire 
(Mandel 1921). In the early to mid-twentieth century, the term generally featured in 
literature covering a range of uncertain outcomes of revolutionary situations, such 
as the expatriation of populations and the status of governments in exile (Mandel 
1921, Lauterpacht 1927, 1928 and 1945, Kelsen 1941). However, this usage then 
appears to have faded from attention, even though in the contexts of civil and 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO ODZ WKH WHUP ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ >Aberkennung] had been most 
developed in German legal theory to describe anomalous cases of denaturalization 
(See, for instance, Schnitzler 1871). Denaturalization, banishment and expatriation --
- all known legal practices since at least the Roman Empire Ʌ were a common 
practice of the German princely states, applied to such known personalities as the 
Grimm brothers. (Martus 2009). (It has most recently been brought to popular 
DWWHQWLRQ LQ WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH H[SDWULDWLRQ RI 'RQDOG 7UXPSɉV DQFHVWRU IURP
Bavaria.) (Trump 1905/2017). In this context, the practice was especially 
problematised in Weimar constitutional debates (Goltsche 1922).  
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Thus, the theme of repurposing former habits of privileged groups is 
SDUWLFXODUO\VDOLHQW LQ0D[:HEHUɉV OHFWXUHRQPolitics as a Vocation. Weber called 
WKHQRELOLW\DɈSROLWLFDOO\UHF\FODEOHQRQ-esWDWHEDVHGVWUDWXPɉ:HEHU+HZDV
against the intervention of actual former nobles in modern politics, but he advocated 
the conversion of noble values into modern politics. In short, intellectuals who lived 
through revolutions and, to some extent, actively participated in establishing new 
UHJLPHV OLNH 0D[ :HEHU DQG *HRUJ /XN£FV KDYH OHIW D IDU ULFKHU UHSRVLWRU\ RI
FRQFHSWVWKDQWKHSUHYLRXVIRFXVRQWKHɈVWDWHɉDQGRQɈUHFRJQLWLRQɉKDVDOORZHGIRU
Thetheoretical interest in the consciousness of representatives of formerly governing 
elites was also shared by contemporary French historians in the interwar era. 
According to Maurice Halbwachs and Marc Bloch, the nobility was a prime example 
for the persistence of privileged social groups through the function of collective 
ɈFDGUHVɉRIPHPRU\DNLQWRWKH3ODWRQLFɊ,GHDɉ%ORFK0DXULFH+DOEZDFKV
writing in the 1920s, used the nobility as a prime example for arguing that social 
groups and classes were historically malleable and able to redefine themselves from 
ZLWKLQVRFLDOFODVVHVUHODWLYHO\ZHUHJURXSVZKR¦SRVVHVVRUZKRGRQRWSRVVHVV
WKHNLQGRITXDOLWLHVPRVWDSSUHFLDWHGLQWKHLUVRFLHW\ɉ+DOEZDFKV 
The political and social thought of theorists who lived through several 
revoOXWLRQV*HRUJ/XN£FVvVHDUO\ UHIOHFWLRQVRI  LVHVSHFLDOO\SHUWLQHQW LQ WKLV
UHJDUGVLQFH/XN£FVKDGWKHFDVHVRI5XVVLD*HUPDQ\DQGDOVR%«OD.¼QvV+XQJDU\
EHIRUHKLVH\HV/XN£FV $VDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHGWKHFHQWUDOWHUPIRU/XN£FV
was consciousness, not recognition, but he paid particular attention to the place and 
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subjectivity of social groups whose status was changing in revolutionary periods. 
Articulating a concern for the success of the revolutionary project, he observed how 
groups like the petty bourgeoisie, but also nobles who effectively should by now 
HPEUDFHWKHFODVVFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWKHERXUJHRLVLHZLOOLQDGYHUWHQWO\DFWɈSDVWWKHLU
GHVWLQ\ɉ>ɈDP6FKLFNVDOYRUEHLKDQGHOQɉ@Ʌ i..e. behave in ways which contradicts the 
logic of theiUVXSSRVHGLQWHUHVWVXQGHUDGLDOHFWLFDOFRQFHSWLRQRISURJUHVV/XN£FV
1923, 70-72). This process is described in more detail in History and Class 
Consciousness. $VKHSXW LW WKHUH WKH ɈFRQVFLRXVQHVVɉ FDQ LQ IDFW ODJEHKLQG WKH
historical process, so thaW D VRFLDO JURXS FDQ WKLQN RI LWVHOI DV D Ɉ.QLJKW RI WKH
5HIRUPDWLRQHUDɉDQGDVWKDWɈSDUWLFXODUVHJPHQWRIVRFLHW\ZKLFKGUDZVEHQHILWV
IURP SULYLOHJHVɉ <HW DW WKH VDPH WLPH DV DQ HVWDWH WKLV VHJPHQW FDQ EH
ɈHFRQRPLFDOO\DOUHDG\HQWLUHO\GHFRPSRVHG its members can economically already 
belong to different classes [his emphasis] whilst retaining this (objectively unreal) 
LGHRORJLFDOFRPSRVXUHɉ7KHUHDVRQIRUWKLVZDVWKDWWKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIDQHVWDWH
GUHZLWVOHJLWLPDF\QRWIURPɈUHDOOLYLQJHFRQRPLFXQLW\ɉEXWDɈIL[DWLRQXSRQDSDVW
society which had once legitimated its estate-EDVHGSULYLOHJHVɉ/XNDFV-70). 
In this broader sense of a social practice with political implications, the 
FRQFHSWRIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ has particular pertinence for understanding changes of 
status times of political instability. As I suggest, the concept has an untapped 
potential for describing processes by which governments, groups, or individuals can 
recalibrate social statuses through a combination of formal and informal social 
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practice. In the next and last section, I will turn to three areas in which it might 
usefully guide empirical understandings of these.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
Some empirical cases of derecognition 
 
Twentieth-century history provides rich empirical material which can be usefully 
analysed through a focus on the relationship between repeated informal practices 
and actual change of social and political status. However, in many cases historians 
have discussed the relevant cases in separate contexts. I do not suggest that such 
contextual diversity should remain unaccounted for; however, using a common 
conceptual vocabulary to identify connections between a range of different 
empirical case studies which are not typically connected in the scholarship of their 
respective fields can contribute to a more granular understanding of the past. The 
examples I will discuss include the changing status of previously privileged social 
groups, either within a political community or transnationally; the shaming of 
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governments by their own citizens; and the devaluation of artefacts previously 
recognised as valuable. Most examples can be contextualised within the history of 
central and eastern Europe in the early to mid-twentieth century, but these are also 
applicable to a wider range of situations.  
7KH ILUVW FDVH VWXG\ SHUWDLQV WR WKH KLVWRU\ RI (XURSHɉV SRVWLPSHULDO
transformation in the twentieth century, particularly, to the revolutions in the Russian 
and German empires (1917-1922). Whilst proceeding with different degrees of 
radicalism, these tectonic shifts in the socioeconomic and political makeup of central 
and eastern Europe had some features in common too, and historians have recently 
highlighted these cross-imperial connections and parallels (Gatrell 2007, Gerwarth 
and Manela 2014, Smele 2016, Gusejnova 2016, Smith 2017, Chernev 2017). One of 
these was the depreciation of status forms which had been considered privileged 
under the old regimes. 
In PRVW VXFFHVVRU VWDWHV WR (XURSHɉV HPSLUes, (XURSHɉV ROG HOLWHV ZHUH
divested of power  (Reif 1994 and 2000, Wehler 1990). Despite different degrees of 
radicalism, the revolutionary and republican regimes emerging across a wide area 
reaching from the Urals to the Rhine did have some common policies. The Bolsheviks 
took an essentialist approach to people of formerly privileged status, suggeesting 
that being noble was nearly equivalent to doing something. Class could not simpy 
be removed like a cloak or a badge, even though social historians have subsequently 
shown how the Soviet regime ultimately ascribed class rather than identifying or 
GLVFRYHULQJɈLWɉFI)LW]SDWULFNThe relevant Bolshevik Decree of 10 November 
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1917 (23 November, according to the new calendar) abolished noble status together 
with several other estates associated with imperial governance: the clergy, the 
merchants and other privileges associated with life in the city, village dwellers, ethnic 
aliens or inorodtsy (particularly, Jews and the peoples of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia), and Finnish residents. Another example of Bolshevik practices of derecognition 
was its disavowal and violent persecution of Orthodox clergy. This prompted its 
leading figures to do the same in response, leading to such declarations as Patriarch 
7LNKRQɉV$QDWKHPDRI-DQXDU\1 Whilst forging a new identity which became the 
essence of Sovietness, this process also created a new social group, the lishentsy, or 
ɈGHSULYHHVɉPHDQLQJSHRSOHGHSULYHGRIWKHLUIRUPHUVWDWXV 
But the ripples of Bolshevik practices of derecognition transcended the 
boundaries of the emergent Soviet state. Ɋ:KHQ,ORRNDWP\VHOIVRFLRORJLFDOO\WKH
loss of my landed roots in particular has meant that there was not much left but to 
preserve a figure that was, historicDOO\VSHDNLQJGHDGɈ.H\VHUOLQJ+HUPDQQ
Keyserling was a Baltic German of aristocratic lineage from the Russian Empire, who 
lost his Estonian estate and his title in the revolution of 1917 and later lectured and 
wrote about European identity from a base in Germany (Gusejnova 2015 and 2016). 
Cases like his can be of interest to historians as well as to social theorists for its 
discussion of the subjective experience of status change. The disavowal of the 
different privileges of nobles took a different legal form and had diverse symbolic 
representations in newly founded Czechoslovakia, in the Baltic states and in the 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to Miriam Dobson for drawing my attention to this point. 
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German republic. Considering such examples to be case studies RIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQ 
practiceɉ PLJKW EH KHOSIXO LQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ D FRQWHxt for comparison, as well as 
drawing attention to the social and psychological context in which entire social strata 
ZHUHɈGHPRWHGɉ7KHVHUDQJHGIURPVRFLDOO\VWLJPDWL]LQJIRUPHUO\VXSHULRUJURXSV
to their physical extermination.  
TKHQRWLRQRI ɈIRUPHU SHRSOHɉ DV D OHJDO-historical term had been around 
since the French Revolution, which brought into circulation the idea of the ci-devant. 
The early Soviet ideologues developed this term through the concept of byvshye 
lyudi (i.e.ɈSHRSOHRIWKHROGUHJLPHɉ, applying it not only to nobles and royalty, but 
also to major landowners, clergymen, and merchants. Because the Soviet case was 
so radical, it was often considered in isolation from other European examples. 
However, linking this example to less violent practices of stigmatization might enable 
historians to utilise more transnational and comparative approaches of the European 
revolutions. The case of Keyserling, the Baltic Baron and Russian subject turned 
German citizen, is a good biographical example of the need for such perspectives. 
As someone whose original deprivation of status was associated with the Bolsheviks, 
he spent his subsequent life in the politically ɈPLOGHUɉ FOLPDWH RI WKH *HUPDQ
republican regime, before the Nazis enforced his renewed commitment to the Aryan 
race.  
UVLQJ WKH WHUP ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ DFURVV the borders of these different 
postimperial successor states would enable historians and theorists to capture an 
essential similarity behind the logic of these practices. Historians studying these 
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regions have analysed not only the declining social status of aristocratic families, but 
also their adaptation to changing circumstances in the context of what Arno Mayer 
famously called WKHɈSHUVLVWHQFHRIWKHROGUHJLPHɉ0D\HU:HKOHU1990; Reif 2000; 
Conze and Wienfort 2004; Reif 2000, Wienfort 2006). What is interesting in this 
context is the relationship between economic and symbolic power and political 
power, but also, the subjective experience of those formerly privileged individuals 
and groups. 
The revolutionary and republican regimes in Europe around 1917 developed 
a wide range of cultural practices aimed at diminishing the power of the social 
JURXSV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH ɈROG UHJLPHɉ In Germany, not one but twenty two 
revolutions occurred between 1917 and 1920, yet this period is not typically discussed 
DV D Ɉ*HUPDQ 5HYROXWLRQɉ ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH +RKHQ]ROOHUQV WKUHH NLQJV RI WKH
:LWWHOVEDFK:HWWLQHUDQG:¾UWWHPEHUJIDPLOLHVVL[JUDQGGXNHVILYHGXNHVDQG
seven princes lost their right to rule in their regional states. In Austria, in addition to 
a law dubbed the Habsburgergesetz, which outlawed specifically Habsburg claims 
WR VRYHUHLJQW\ LQ WKH G\QDVW\ɉV IRUPHU KHDUWODQG WKH XVH RI QREOH WLWOHV ZDV
outlawed. Nobles of Germanic background also lost power In Estonia and Poland, 
laws passed in 1920 and 1921 also abolished all noble titles, while in Lithuania and 
Latvia, references to noble privilege were simply omitted from their new 
constitutions.  
7KH QRWLRQ RI ɈGerecognitionɉ DQG LWV VRFLDO LPSOLFDWLRQV could help to 
contextualise the debates of Weimar jurists on different sides of the political 
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spectrum DWDWLPHRI*HUPDQ\ɉVSROLWLFDOWUDQVLWLRQIURPHPSLUHWRUHSXEOLF. These 
jurists were concerned with building a new republican tradition, in which political 
allegiance to the German republic was to be married to the aim of achieving 
constitutional equality between German states, as well as the equality of privileges 
among German subjects (Goltsche 2010, Jacobsen and Schlink 2000, Kelly 2003 and 
2004). In this context, one major constitutional debate revolved around the question 
of measures of expropriation against former princely rulers, as well as the status of 
their symbolic privileges (Schmitt 1926: 25-7, Wehler 1990, Reif 2000). When it comes 
to the subjective experience of losing privilege, for historians, the importance of 
non-FRQYHUVLRQDPRQJ WKHPLOLWDU\HOLWHVRI (XURSHɉVROG HPSLUHV LV D LPSRUWDQW
theme in recent historical research (Ziemann 2013, Matzerath and Marburg 2001). 
Ɉ1REOHFRQVFLRXVQHVVɉRUAdelsbewusstsein, is now often studied based on primary 
sources based on individual or group biographies and family histories (Conze 2000; 
Malinowski 2003; Glassheim 2005). 
As social scientists working with historical material, like Sofia Tchouikina, have 
shown, the process of making Soviet citizenship revealed a complex set of 
adaptation practices involving the conversion of a wide range of habitus and skills 
(Tchouikina 2017). Looking at twentieth-century Poland, the anthropologist Longina 
Jakubowska has observed that aristocratic identity persisted there in the linguistic 
and social juxtapositon of the term pan WKHZRUGIRUɈVLUɉZLWKWKHWHUPcham, and 
also through the distinction between the szlachta (the community of gentry) and the 
Jews. When pan became widely available to all educated Poles, the words cham and 
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Ɉ-HZɉEHFDPHPDUNHUVRIQDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\7KHQRWLRQRIUDFLDOGLIIHUHQFHEHFDPH
important not only for the palingenetic myths of nations, but also for supranational 
W\SHVRIUDFLVPVXFKDVWKH1D]LLGHDRIWKH$U\DQUDFH(DFKQHZW\SHRIɈVLUɉFUHDWHV
a psychological counter-LPDJHRIDQHZɈERRUɉ-DNXERZVND 
Cultural historians working on this period of central and eastern European 
history PLJKWEHLQWHUHVWHGLQXVLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉWRDQDO\VHWKH
removal of symbolism from streets and public buildings, which is associated with the 
privilege of former groups. This is of course best known through case studies such 
as the stripping of imperial symbolism in revolutionary Russia, which had been buit 
up around the imperial family particularly in the last century of its existence 
(Wortman 2000, on revolutionary symbolism, see Figes and Kolonitsky 1999, Bonnell 
1996). Less well known is the less spectacular symbolic vocabulary of depreciating 
empire in Weimar Germany. There was debate, around 1918, whether to blow up the 
statues of Prussian kings adorning the Alley of VictoU\ >Ɉ6LHJHVDOOHHɉ@ LQ%HUOLQDQ
unpopular project initiated by Wilhelm II to commemorate the defeat of France in 
the Franco-3UXVVLDQ ZDU RI  DQG GHULVLYHO\ FDOOHG Ɉ$OOH\ RI 3XSSHWVɉ E\
Berliners. It had only been completed in 1901 and included a genealogical parade of 
German rulers from Albrecht of Prussia, the last grand master of the Teutonic Order, 
to the Prussian King Wilhelm I. The revolutionary debate prompted the satirist Kurt 
7XFKROVN\WRDVNɈ:KDWZLOOFRPHRIWKH6LHJHVDOOHH":LOOWKH\GUive it out of the city 
towards the New Lake because it is too royalist, too autocratic and too monarchist? 
>ɒ@:LOOWKH\PDLQWDLQWKHVWDWXHVEXWSODFHQHZKHDGVRQWKHVDPHQHFNV">ɒ@$QG
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ZDVDOOWKDWOHDUQLQJRIWKHLUQDPHVIRUP\H[DPVLQYDLQ"ɉ7LJHUTucholsky 1918). 
&RQFHSWXDOLVLQJ WKHVH FDVHV WKURXJK WKH WHUP ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ ZRXOG HQDEOH
historians to compare the postimperial transformation of European society in 
contemporaneous epochs and under different political regimes. 
Another set of historical case studies which could be usefully captured with 
WKHFRQFHSWRIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ is the disavowal of governments by their own citizens 
as well as by the international community. Just as governments can derecognise 
their own citizens in the act of denaturalization, citizens as well as other societies 
and international powers can derecognise governments. They do this by means of 
soft power, diplomatic channels, or informal relations. Both of these aspects in the 
relationship between governments and people flared up as four empires crumbled 
in the wake of the First World War, and the treaties of Paris, Versailles, Trianon and 
Brest-Litovsk came to represent the rather shifting landscape constituting the 
international community. Hannah Arendt has famously described this moment as 
initiating a series of disappointments with the promises of the nation-state (Arendt 
1951, 269, in ɈThe Decline of the Nation-VWDWHDQGWKH(QGRIWKH5LJKWVRI0DQɉ). But 
the crisis in recognition in the aftermath of imperial collapse implies a multiple sense 
of institutional failures: empires and their successors derecognised their subjects 
through acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing, as empires broke down their various 
constituent parts, comprising associations formed on political, ethnic, and religious 
grounds, derecognised the old elites, while non-continental powers such as Britain 
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and the United States saw themselves confronted with a range of choices towards 
the new powers as well. 
The aftermaths of the two World Wars, are a particularly fertile ground for 
VWXG\LQJ QRWLRQV RI ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉ. In the first instance, this was due to the 
heightened interest in the recognition of governments by legal theorists, historians, 
as well as diplomatic stafff involved in representing the old European powers in times 
of rapid political change (Lippman 1919, Lauterpacht 1927a, 1927b, and 1928, 
0HOɉJXQRY, Noble 1935; Lauterpacht 2013/1947, Epstein 19596KXOɉJLQ). 
Anti-Bolshevik parties involved in the Russian Civil War, intellectuals and military 
SHUVRQQHODVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFRXQWHUUHYROXWLRQDU\ Ɉ:KLWH0RYHPHQWɉUHSHDWHGO\
denounced the emergent Bolshevik regime, informally derecognising what was de 
facto, and eventually also de jure, a sovereign power (Katzer 1999, Wiederkehr 2007). 
From this basis, they published journals and other widely read works in print, in 
ZKLFK WKH\ QRW RQO\ GHQRXQFHG 5XVVLDɉV UHYROXWLRQDU\ UHJLPH EXW H[SRVHG LWV
corruptibility (Raeff 1990). In the absence of a legal heir to the monarchy, and living 
in exile, they nonetheless held on to organisations such as the Zemgor, the regional 
types of self-government which disintegrated with the empire.  
Yet another FRQWH[W LQZKLFK WKH WHUP ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉPLJKW DSSO\ WR WKH
relationship between governments and civil societies in Weimar and Nazi Germany, 
highlighting some of the connections in the social histories of both regimes which 
are often sidelined. In the Weimar period, a legal initiative knoZQDVWKHɈ5DGEUXFK
'UDIWɉ, associated with the work of the jurist Gustav Radbruch, spelled out in detail 
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the legal foundations of the possibility of civil litigation against police injustice and 
criminal behaviour that can be ascribed to state representatives (Goltsche 2010). A 
VLPLODUPRPHQWRIɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉE\FLWL]HQVRIJRYHQPHQWVFDQEHREVHUYHGLQWKH
case of populations who were exiled or expatriated due to the rise of Nazi Germany. 
Using the FRQFHSWRIɈ7KH2WKHU*HUPDQ\ɉLQWKHVDQGV inspired by the 
Weimar-era liberal and pacifist newspaper Das andere Deutschland  [The other 
Germany] (founded in 1925), exiles rallied support for what could be described as an 
informal Germany in exileRUDɈKXPDQLVWIURQWɉ%HUHQGVRKQ 
This cultural alternative to a derecognised state could be usefully compared 
to the emergence of governments in exile representing French, Polish or 
Czechoslovak dissidents with varying degrees of diplomatic and institutional 
formality (on governments in exile, cf. Oppenheimer 1942, more recently, Shain and 
Linz 1995, Conway and Gotovitch 2001, McGilvray 2010). The concept of 
ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉZRXOGEHFDSDFLRXVHQRXJKWRallow scholars to evaluate the relative 
impact of cultural, diplomatic and military powers in enabling or disabling the 
recognition of governments by their own as well as by foreign constituents. 
 To mention a third case briefly, the ideological depreciation of previously 
valuable cultural artefacts could also be considered as a practice of derecognition. 
Once again, the period concerned is the series of transformations in the structure of 
legitimation in central and eastern Europe, from the collapse of its empires to the 
defeat of the Third Reich. Such a broad conceptualisation of a century of extremes, 
which has been made popular again recently by the historiographical perspectives 
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offered by Timothy Snyder and others (Snyder 2010, Gerwarth and Horne 2012). It 
could be fruitfully deepened by looking at the function of cultural policy in the period 
of radical social transformation through the lens of derecognition. Key institutions 
such as the early Academy for the Study of the Arts in Soviet Russia, the 
Reichskulturkammer in Nazi Germany, and other bodies, were responsible for 
backing to the construction of new ideologies.  
 7KH ZRUN RI WKH DIRUHPHQWLRQHG 5XVVLDQ SKLORVRSKHU *XVWDY ÒSHW PLJKW
serve as a biographical example here. Despite being at the forefront of efforts to 
unify Marxist-Leninist perspectives on aesthetics in the early years of Soviet rule, he 
eschewed the conventions of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and instead became an 
REMHFWRIWKHQHZUHJLPHɉV ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉRIERXUJRHRLVSKLORVRSKLFDOGRFWULQHV. 
ÒSHWɉV QDPHPDGH LW WR WKH LQIDPRXV OLVW RI XQGHVLUDEOH SKLORVRSKHUV WKDW /HQLQ
RUGHUHGRXWRI WKHFRXQWU\ LQRQWKH Ɉ3KLORVRSKHUɉVVWHDPHUɉ 'XHWRÒSHWɉV
refusal to emigrate, however, he not only failed to find a hearing in western Europe 
until the twenty-first century, but also precluded a reception in Russian contexts. 
ÒSHW ZDV H[HFXWHG DPRQJ PDVV DUUHVWV LQ  DQG KLV ZRUN KDV RQO\ UHFHQWO\
received detailed attention from historians (Plotnikov 2013). But considered in 
FRQWH[WÒSHWɉVZRUNRQ +HJHOɉVFRQFHSWRIUHFRJQLWLRQSURYLGHVDIDVFLQDWLQJLQVLJKW
into the practice of derecognition at the level of science and culture. 
The styles and approaches in the visual arts, intellectual history and music, 
which were endorsed were intimately connected with ideas about old and new 
regimes  (Plotnikov 2013, or, for a primary source, Ziegler 1938). Rather than viewing 
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the emergence and later persecution of the cultural avantgardes in Soviet Russia, 
Weimar and later Nazi Germany, as separate instances, the concept of derecognition 
could help conceptualise the social process by which such collective decisions to 
depreciate entire directions of thought and culture were made or became 
acceptable. This understanding of the role of informal social practice in providing 
political legitimacy has been more common in studies of the Cold War, but it is yet 
to be linked conceptually to our understanding of the earlier twentieth century (Cf. 
Scott-Smith and Krabbendam 2003, and others, including Gusejnova 2016). 
 
 
What I have suggested here is that thinking conceptually about a variety of social 
practices as instances of ɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉFDQUHYHDOSUHYLRXVO\XQVHHQFRQQHFWLRQV
in European history. The empirical examples can add texture and complexity to the 
established theories of recognition. It is worth thinking about the fact that Hegel 
himself, despite writing in the wake of the French Revolution, ultimately ended up 
celebrating the Prussian state -- the very opposite of a revolutionary polity. What 
remained crucial for those influenced by his work was the connection between 
consciousness and conceptions of progress. But what has faded from attention 
among social theorists, if not philosophers (e.g. Pippin 2011), ZDV +HJHOɉV RZQ
comprehension of the link between aesthetic and political representation on the one 
hand, and social transformation on the other.  
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Even though the above examples stem from European case studies, as I have 
LQGLFDWHGWKHWHUPɈGHUHFRJQLWLRQɉFDQEHHTXDOO\IUXLWIXOLQH[DPLQLQJWKHSURFHVV
of alternative sovereignty formation beyond Europe. Examples might include the 
process of decolonisation, notably in India (Copland 1997), or the social practices 
emerging in republican China (Harrison 2000). Enriching the conceptual vocabulary 
of recognition theory with attention to the social practices of derecognition could 
contribute to the development of a critical theory of modern ideologies (Bourdieu 
1972, Honneth 1986, Burke 2005, Freeden 2013). Such a theory of derecognition 
could help to conceptualise the importance of informal practices for political status 
changes, and do so in a way that would be politically agnostic towards the ideology 
prevalent in a particular society. In this way, it might also provide a useful heuristic 
for empirical work on various historical phenomena connected to social change. 
 
 
 
  
  31 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Richard Westerman, Mara Mairin, Leigh Claire La Berge, and 
Nicholas Gaskill, as well as to John Searle and members of the Berkeley Social 
Ontology Group, for their comments on an older draft of this paper. I also thank 
Mary Vincent, Miriam Dobson and Alexis Papazoglou for their constructive feedback 
on a later draft. 
 
References 
Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1983. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony and Amy Gutmann (Eds.) (1996) Color Conscious: The Political 
Morality of Race. Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Arendt, Hannah (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
Auron, Danny (2013) Ɉ7KH'HUHFRJQLWLRQ$SSURDFK*RYHUQPHQW,OOHJDOLW\5HFRJQLWLRQ
and Non-9LROHQW5HJLPH&KDQJHɉGeorge Washington International Law Review, 45, 
443-51.  
Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., Srebrnik, H.F. (Eds.), 2004. De facto states: the quest for 
sovereignty. London: Routledge. 
%¦KU2WWR(1867) Die Anerkennung als Verpflichtungsgrund. Cassel: Wigand. 
Baumgold, Deborah (2010) Contract Theory in Historical Context: Essays on 
Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. Leiden: Brill. 
Beiser, Frederick (2011) ɈHegel and Hegelianismɉ, The Cambridge History of 
Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. Gareth Stedman Jones and 
Gregory Claeys. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 110Ʌ146. 
Berendsohn, Walter A. (1949) 'LHKXPDQLVWLVFKH)URQW(LQI¾KUXQJLQGLHGHXWVFKH
Emigranten Literatur, Vol. 1. Zurich: Europa-Verlag. 
Bloch, Marc (1939) /DVRFL«W«I«RGDOH/HVFODVVHVHWOHJRXYHUQHPHQWGHVKRPPHV. 
Paris: Albin Michel. 
Bonnell, Victoria (1996) Ɉ7KH/HDGHU
V7ZR%RGLHVD6WXG\LQWKH,FRQRJUDSK\RIWKH
Vozhd', Russian History, 23:1, 113Ʌ35. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1972/2013), Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
  32 
Breckman, Warren (1999) Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical 
Social Theory: Dethroning the Self . Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Burke, Peter (2005) History and social theory, 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Butler, Judith (1990) Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New 
York: Routledge. 
&DOYªV$nne-EPPDQXªOH (2009) ɈmௗEmpowermentௗ}ௗJ«Q«DORJLHGɉXQFRQFHSWFO«
GXGLVFRXUVFRQWHPSRUDLQVXUOHG«YHORSSHPHQWɉ Revue Tiers Monde, 200, 
735-49. 
Chernev, Borislav (2017) Twilight of empire: the Brest-Litovsk Conference and the 
remaking of East-Central Europe, 1917-1918. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Conway, MaUWLQDQG-RV«*RWRYLWFKHGV2001) Europe in Exile: European Exile 
Communities in Britain, 1940-1945. New York: Berghahn Books. 
Conze, Eckart (2000) Von deutschem Adel: die Grafen von Bernstorff im 
zwanzigsten Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 
Conze, Eckart and Monika Wienfort, eds. (2004) Adel und Moderne: Deutschland 
LPHXURS¦LVFKHQ9HUJOHLFKLPXQG-DKUKXQGHUW࣯; [Tagung, die im 
0¦U]DP=HQWUXPI¾U,QWHUGLV]LSOLQ¦UH)RUVFKXQJ=L)GHU8QLYHUVLW¦W
Bielefeld stattgefunden hat]. &RORJQH%¸KODX 
Copland, Ian (1997) The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Danto, Arthur C. ɈThe End of Art: A Philosophical Defenseɉ History and 
Theory, 37:4 (December), 127Ʌ43.  
Danto, Arthur C., and Lydia Goehr (1995/2014) After the End of Art: Contemporary 
Art and the Pale of History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Dunn, John (1989) Modern revolutions: an introduction to the analysis of a political 
phenomenon. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Epstein, Fritz (1959) Ɉ6WXGLHQ]XU*HVFKLFKWHGHUɍ5XVVLVFKHQ)UDJHɌDXIGHU3DULVHU
)ULHGHQVNRQIHUHQ]YRQɉ-DKUE¾FKHUI¾U*HVFKLFKWH2VWHXURSDV, 7:4, 431-78. 
Figes, Orlando and Boris Kolonitsky (1999) Interpreting the Russian Revolution. The 
Languages and Symbols of 1917. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
  33 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila (1993) ɈAscribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in 
Soviet RussiaɉThe Journal of Modern History, 65, 745Ʌ770.  
Fraser, Nancy (1989) Unruly practices: Power discourse and gender in 
contemporary social theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Fraser, Nancy (1999) Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, 
Recognition, and Participation. London: Sage. 
Freeden, Michael (2013) The Political Theory of Political Thinking: the Anatomy of a 
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gatrell, Peter (2013) The Making of the Modern Refugee. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gatrell, Peter (2007) ɈIntroduction: World Wars and Population Displacement in 
Europe in the Twentieth Centuryɉ Contemporary European History, 16, 415Ʌ
426. 
Gerwarth, Robert and Erez Manela, eds. (2014) Empires at War: 1911-1923. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Gerwarth, Robert, and John Horne, eds. (2012) War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence 
in Europe after the Great War. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Goltsche, Friederike (2010) $EHUNHQQXQJYRQ%¾UJHUOLFKHQ(KUHQUHFKWHQ'HU
Entwurf Eines Allgemeinen Deutschen Strafgesetzbuches von 1922. Berlin/New 
York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Greenhill, Brian ɈRecognition and Collective Identity Formation in 
International Politicsɉ European Journal of International Relations 14:2, June, 343Ʌ
68.  
Gusejnova, Dina (2016) European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gusejnova, Dina (2015) 'Keyserling's keywords: the challenges of translating 
Europe', Comparativ, 2, October, 29-45. 
Halbwachs, Maurice (1925) /HVFDGUHVVRFLHDX[GHODP«PRLUH Paris : )«OL[$OFDQ 
Harrison, Henrietta (2000) The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political 
Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911-1929. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1807) System der Wissenschaft. Erster Teil,  
  34 
 3K¦QRPHQRORJLHGHV*HLVWHV. Bamberg and :¾U]EXUJ Jos. Ant. Goebhardtsche 
Buchhandlungen. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1998) 9RUOHVXQJHQ¾EHU'LH3KLORVRSKLH'HU.XQVW
(Berlin 1823), after the notes of Heinrich Gustav Hotho. Hamburg: Meiner. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (2014) Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The 
Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 3KLORVRSKLH'HU.XQVW2GHUVWKHWLN1DFK+HJHO
Im Sommer 1826ௗ; Mitschrift Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, eds. 
Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert and Bernadette Collenberg-Plotnikov. Munich: W. 
Fink.. 
Honneth, Axel (1994/2016) Kampf um Anerkennung: zur moralischen Grammatik 
sozialer Konflikte.ௗFrankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Honneth, Axel (2004) ɈRecognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of 
Justiceɉ Acta Sociologica 47, 351Ʌ364.  
Honneth, A., Kocyba, H., Schwibs, B. (1986) ɈThe Struggle for Symbolic Order an 
Interview with Pierre Bourdieuɉ Theory, Culture & Society, 3, 35Ʌ51.  
Jacobsen, Arthur and Bernhard Schlink, eds. (2000) Weimar: A Jurisprudence of 
Crisis. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.  
Jagentowicz Mills, Patricia, ed. (1996) Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel, Re-
reading the Canon. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Kalyvas, Andreas (1999) ɈCritical Theory at the Crossroads: Comments on Axel 
+RQQHWKɉV7KHRU\RI5HFRJQLWLRQɉ European Journal of Social Theory, 2, 99Ʌ
108.  
Katzer, Nikolaus (1999) Die :HL¡e Bewegung in Russland: Herrschaftsbildung, 
3UDNWLVFKH3ROLWLN8QG3ROLWLVFKH3URJUDPPDWLN,P%¾UJHUNULHJ. Cologne: %¸KODX 
.D\HV-RQDWKDQ0Ɉ7KH5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDDQG'HUHFRJQLWLRQ7KH(IIHFWVRQ
7DLZDLQɉJournal of International Affairs, 34:1, 191-94.  
Kelly, Duncan (2004) Ɉ&DUO6FKPLWWɉV3ROLWLFDO7KHRU\RI5HSUHVHQWDWLRQɉJournal of 
the History of Ideas, 65, 113-34.  
Kelly, Duncan (2003) The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics and the State 
in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Keyserling, Hermann (1948). Reise durch die Zeit. Vaduz: Liechtenstein Verlag. 
  35 
.RMªYHAlexandre (1947/2014) ,QWURGXFWLRQ¢ODOHFWXUHGH+HJHOOH©RQVVXUOD
3K«QRPHQRORJLHGHOɉHVSULWSURIHVV«HVGH¢¢OɉFROHGHV+DXWHVWXGHV, 
ed. Raymond Queneau. Paris: Gallimard. 
Kompridis, Nikolas ɈRecognition and Receptivity: Forms of Normative 
Response in the Lives of the Animals We Areɉ New Literary History, 44:1, 1Ʌ24.  
Kompridis, Nikolas (2014)The Aesthetic Turn in Political Thought. New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Koselleck, Reinhart (1973/2004) Ɉ+LVWRULFDO&ULWHULDRIWKH0RGHUQ&RQFHSWRI
5HYROXWLRQɉLQLGHPFutures Past. New York: Columbia University Press, 43-58.  
Kropotkin, Peter (1992) Words of a Rebel, transl. G. Woodcock. Montreal: Black 
Rose Books. 
Lauterpacht, Hersch (1947/2013) Recognition in International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lauterpacht, Hersch (1945) ɈRecognition of Governments: Iɉ Columbia Law Review, 
45, 815Ʌ64. 
Lauterpacht, Hersch (1928) ɈRevolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against 
Foreign Statesɉ The American Journal of International Law, 22, 105Ʌ30. 
Lauterpacht, Hersch (1927a) ɈPrivate Law Sources and Analogies of International 
LawɉLondon and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 
Lauterpacht, Hersch (1927b) ɈRevolutionary Propaganda by Governmentsɉ 
Transactions of the Grotius Society, 13, 143Ʌ64. 
Leonhard, Rudolf (1894) ,QVWLWXWLRQHQGHV5¸PLVFKHQ5HFKWV(LQ/HKUEXFK. Leipzig: 
Veit & Komp. 
Lippman, Walter (1919) Ɉ7KH3HDFH&RQIHUHQFHɉYale Review, 8:4, July, 721.  
Luk£cs, Georg (1923) *HVFKLFKWHXQG.ODVVHQEHZX¡WVHLQ. Berlin:Malik. 
Malinowski, Stefan (2003) 9RP.¸QLJ]XP)¾KUHUVR]LDOHU1LHGHUJDQJXQG
politische Radikalisierung im deutschen Adel zwischen Kaiserreich und NS-
Staat. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 
Mandel, B. (1921) ɈDie Rechte der politischen Emigranten und das deutsch-
russische Abkommen vom 6. Mai 1921Ɉ %O¦WWHUI¾UYHUJOHLFKHQGH
Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre XVI, 157Ʌ74. 
Martus, Steffen (2009) 'LH%U¾GHU*ULPP(LQH%LRJUDSKLH. Berlin: Rowohlt. 
  36 
Marx, Karl (1846/1932) ɊDie deutsche IdeologieɈLQ0DU[-Engels Gesamtausgabe, 
pt. I. vol. V. Berlin: Marx-Engels Institute Moscow, 1932. 
Mayer, Arno J. (2010) The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War. 
London: Verso. 
McGilvray, Evan (2010) A Military Government in Exile: the Polish government-in-
exile, 1939-1945. Solihull: Helion. 
0HOɉJXQRY6HUJH\3 (1929), N. V.  aikovski v gody grazdanskoj voiny. Materialy 
dlia istorii russkoi obsēestvennosti 1917-1925 [NV. Caikovski in the years of 
civil war. Materials for a history of Russian civil society 1917-1925],  2 vols. 
Paris: Rodnik. 
0LOOHU-DVRQɈThe Role of Aesthetics in Hegelian Theories of Recognitionɉ 
Constellations, 23:1, March, 96Ʌ109.  
Noble, George Bernard (1935) Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919: Wilsonian 
Diplomacy, the Versailles Peace, and French Public Opinion. New York: 
Macmillan. 
2QXI1LFRODVɈRecognition and the constitution of epochal changeɉ
International Relations, 27, 121Ʌ140.  
2SSHQKHLPHU)(Ɉ*RYHUQPHQWVDQG$XWKRULWLHVLQ([LOHɉThe American 
Journal of International Law, 36:4, 568-595. 
Pippin, Robert B. (2011) Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Plotnikov, Nikolaj (2013) ɈHegel at the GAKhN: Between Idealism and MarxismɆon 
the Aesthetic Debates in Russia in the 1920sɉ Studies in East European Thought, 
65:3-4, December, 213Ʌ25.  
Raeff, Marc (1990) Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 
1919-1939. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Reif, Heinz (1994) Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der 
Weimarer Republik: Agrarkrise - junkerliche Interessenpolitik - 
Modernisierungsstrategien. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 
Reif, Heinz (1999) Adel Im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert. Munich:Oldenbourg 
Sands, Philippe (2016) East West Street: on the Origins of Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
  37 
Schmitt, Carl (1926) 8QDEK¦QJLJNHLWGHU5LFKWHU*OHLFKKHLWYRUGHP*HVHW]XQG
*HZ¦KUOHLVWXQJGHV3ULYDWHLJHQWXPVQDFKGHU:HLPDUHU9HUIDVVXQJ(LQ
5HFKWVJXWDFKWHQ]XGHQ*HVHW]HQWZ¾UIHQ¾EHUGLH
9HUP¸JHQVDXVHLQDQGHUVHW]XQJPLWGHQIU¾KHUUHJLHUHQGHQ)¾UVWHQK¦XVHUQ. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.  
Shain, Yossi, Juan J. Linz, and Lynn Berat (1995) Between States: Interim 
Governments and Democratic Transitions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Schnitzler, Leo (1871) Die Aberkennung der StaDWVDQJHK¸ULJNHLWnach den 
Bestimmungen dHV5HLFKVJHVHW]HV¾EHUdie Erwerbung und den Verlust der 
Bundes- uQG6WDDWVDQJHK¸ULJNHLWvom 1. Juni 1870&RORJQH.¸OQHU9HUODJV-
Anstalt und Druckerei. 
Schwoerer, Lois G. (1993), Ɉ7KHULJKWWRUHVLVW:KLJUHVLVWDQFHWKHRU\-ɉLQ
Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, 
eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 232-53. 
Searle, John (1990), The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press. 
Sewell, William (1999) ɈThe concept(s) of cultureɉLQ Beyond the Cultural Turn: New 
Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, eds. Victoria Bonnell, Lynn 
Hint and Richard Biernacki. Berkeley: University of California Press, 35Ʌ62. 
Shklar, Judith (2001) American Citizenship: the Quest for Inclusion. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Shulމgin, Vasily (1984) The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 
1906-1917. New York: Hippocrene Books. 
Skocpol, Theda (1979/2015) States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis 
of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smele, Jonathan (2016) 7KHɋ5XVVLDQɌCivil Wars, 1916-1926: Ten Years that Shook 
the World. London: Hurst. 
Smith, Steven (2017) Russia in Revolution: an Empire in Crisis, 1890 to 1928. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Snyder, Timothy (2010) Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. New York: 
Basic Books. 
ÒSHW*ustav (1922) Estetiēeskie fragmenty. Moskva: Kolos. 
  38 
ÒSHWGustav (2005) ×izn YSLVɉPDNK(SLVWROMDUQRHQDVOHGLH, ed. Tatiana ÒFHGULQDMoscow: 
Rosspen. 
Subramani, R. Venkata (2009) Accounting for investments. Singapore: Wiley & 
Sons. 
Taylor, Charles (1975/2005) Hegel Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, Charles, and Amy Gutmann (1982) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics 
of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tchouikina, Sofia (2017) /HVJHQVGɉDXWUHIRLV ODQREOHVVHUXVVHGDQVODVRFL«W«
VRYL«WLTXH Paris : Belin. 
7LJHU7KHREDOGDND.XUW7XFKROVN\Ɉ%UXFKɉUlk, 13 December, 50. 
Trump, Friedrich (1905./2017) Ɉ7KH(PLJUDQWVɉUHSULQWHGLQHarpers Magazine, 
March, https://harpers.org/archive/2017/03/the-emigrants/. Accessed 30 
January 2017. 
8QJHU/HRQDUGɈ'HUHFRJQLWLRQ:RUNHGɉForeign Policy, 36, Autumn, 105-21. 
Vincent, K. Steven (2011) Ɉ9LVLRQVRIVWDWHOHVVVRFLHW\ɉLQThe Cambridge History of 
Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, eds. Gareth Stedman-Jones and Gregory 
Claeys. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 433-76. 
Waldron, Jeremy (2012) Dignity, Rank, and Rights. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Weber, MD[Ɋ3ROLWLNDOV%HUXIɈLQLGHPGeistige Arbeit als Beruf. Vier 
9RUWU¦JHYRUGHP)UHLVWXGHQWLVFKHQ%XQG. Zweiter Vortrag. Munich and 
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 
Wiederkehr, Stefan (2007) Die Eurasische Bewegung: Wissenschaft Und Politik in 
Der Russischen Emigration Der Zwischenkriegszeit Und Im Postsowjetischen 
Russland. Cologne%¸KODX 
Winnicott, Donald (1990) The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating 
Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development. London: 
Karnac books. 
Wortman, Richard S. (2000) From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ziegler, Hans Severus (1938) Entartete Musik, eine Abrechnung, Exhibition catalogue, 
British Library, 7901.bb.57. 
  39 
Ziemann, Benjamin (2013) *HZDOWLP(UVWHQ:HOWNULHJ7¸ WHQ- EHUOHEHQɅ 
Verweigern. Essen: Klartext. 
Zurn, Christopher F. (2005) ɈRecognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas 
of HRQQHWKɉV&ULWLFDO6RFLDO7KHRU\ɉ European Journal of Philosophy, 13 (89Ʌ126). 
